INTRODUCTION [I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that
no man shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross examine. 1 At his 2005 Senate confirmation hearing for the office of Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, then District of Columbia Circuit Judge John Roberts, Jr. likened judges to umpires, and unlike today most constitutional rules of criminal procedure did not apply in state courts. 10 Additionally, the shared standard between confrontation and due process that existed at the time 11 made it less likely that a contrary ruling in Williams would have yielded a different result for most felony defendants.
Today, however, the modern U.S. criminal justice system is "verging on an assembly line." 12 Due to plea-bargaining, the vast majority of felony defendants do not have the opportunity to test statements made against them before the sentencing hearing. 13 Justice Kennedy instructs that " [t] o note the prevalence of plea bargaining is not to criticize it." 14 In this modern system, it can no longer be disputed that the adversarial process does not end once a verdict or plea of guilty is rendered. As Justice Kennedy instructs, the adversarial process extends to sentencing. Now more than ever, factual findings made during felony sentencing hearings are as quantitatively vital as those that were previously only made during trials. There is no conclusive empirical evidence that judges, those primarily making the factual findings at sentencing, are more reliable fact finders than juries. 15 Yet, during these proceedings the rules governing the location of the "strike zone," i.e. the range of properly exercised discretion, can vary from court to court.
Crawford gives reason to reconsider the applicability of confrontation principles at felony sentencing-the most critical stage of the modern criminal prosecution. 16 This Article focuses on whether Crawford's rejection of hearsay rules as the standard for confrontation reopens doors that many thought Williams had irrevocably closed. This Article advocates a limited Crawford-based approach to 9 .
Even if trials were uncommon in 1949, they were not as "rare as the spotted owl" as they 16. Admittedly, this may require substantive changes in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to felony sentencing.
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Unlike many articles on this subject, this Article distinguishes categories of statements that should require cross-examination from statements that should not require cross-examination. Finally, this Article offers a framework for making the right call in felony cases. 18 Part I of this Article examines Williams and discusses its holding that a felony defendant was unable to cross-examine information contained in a probation report that was presented for the first time at sentencing. It concludes that Williams was a reflection of the post-Founding shift from a determinate to an indeterminate sentencing model, the latter of which was at its height when Williams was decided. Part II examines the application of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause to felony sentencing before the time of the Founding. It examines whether pre-Founding courts had discretion to consider un-cross-examined testimonial statements for purposes of fixing punishment for felonies. It also explores the post-Founding emergence of bifurcation and plea-bargaining and demonstrates that judicial discretion to consider uncrossed information at felony sentencing most likely developed during the emergence of indeterminate sentencing, not from pre-Founding courts. Part III examines the Court's recent untethering of due process and confrontation principles in Crawford. It argues that Williams should no longer control whether or when cross-examination is required at felony sentencing. The Article concludes that confrontation is the right call where felony sentencing evidence consists of testimonial statements that are material to punishment and where cross-examination would assist in assessing the truth and veracity of such statements. 17 . The following issues are beyond the scope of this Article: whether confrontation is required at felony sentencing as a matter of procedural due process; whether Crawford should apply at misdemeanor sentencing hearings; and implications of the Jury Trial Clause jurisprudence that includes Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) , and its progeny.
18. Readers may be surprised to discover that there is an impressive amount of student scholarship related to the topic of this Article. See On April 20, 1947, fifteen-year-old Selma Graff was fatally bludgeoned by a bedroom intruder in her family's East Flatbush apartment located in Brooklyn, New York. 20 In the months after the murder, a series of burglaries plagued the neighborhood, and East Flatbush was placed under surveillance. 21 At approximately 2:30 a.m. on September 8, 1947, Samuel Tito Williams was taken into custody for suspicion of burglary. 22 Samuel was an eighteen-year-old African-American youth with a history of trouble with law enforcement, but no prior convictions. 23 Samuel's physical condition was described as poor. A rheumatic fever weakened his heart and caused swelling in his legs; the latter made it difficult for him to walk. 24 Selma's younger brother Donald was also injured in the attack and originally described the killer as a man with reddish skin who needed a shave. 25 25. See Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 6. A police teletype released shortly after the murder described Selma's killer as "a white man, and the police 'generally' were looking for a white man." Id. at 6-7. At least one news agency reported that Donald described the killer as a slender and tall Negro youth. 
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Samuel orally confessed to the murder and later submitted a longhand written confession after eighteen continuous hours of interrogation. 27 During the first sixteen hours, detectives were authorized to only ask about the burglaries. 28 At some point, detectives stopped the interrogation and Samuel was taken to the scene of several suspected burglaries in the hope that a witness could identify him as the perpetrator. 29 It is unclear whether anyone was able to do so. After the confessions, the District Attorney conducted a stenographically-recorded question and answer session that began at approximately 12:45 a.m. on September 9, 1947 and was attended by members of the press. 30 Later in the morning, between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m., Samuel was booked for murder and taken to felony court. 31 could see a chaplain and his mother, the latter for whom he had asked multiple times during the interrogation. Williams, 323 F.2d at 66; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 16-17. Detectives reported to the media that in his confession, Samuel indicated that in the hours before the murder he drank "Sneaky Pete," a drink concocted of raw whisky and wine, and that he decided to burglarize the Graff home because he needed money to buy more of the beverage. 
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Making the Right Call 797 school so that a positive identification could be made, which Donald was unable to do. 32 Up to this point, Samuel had not been provided with the assistance of counsel.
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Despite the confessions, Samuel pled not guilty, and his murder trial began in January of 1948. 34 Donald, the only witness to the crime, testified during cross-examination that Selma's killer was a white man who had red skin and stood five-feet five-inches tallseven inches shorter than Samuel, who stood six-feet tall. 35 The next day, Donald recanted his description of the killer, claiming he was "all mixed up." 36 Curiously, Donald's recantation came after speaking the previous evening with detectives and the District Attorney, the latter later submitting that his case in chief did not rely on Donald's testimony. 37 Regardless, this left the confessions, which defense counsel argued were the result of coercion, as the only evidence of Samuel's guilt. 38 The all-male jury 39 found 38. Williams, 323 F.2d at 67. Samuel "testified, and not without some corroboration, to brutal torture by the police which had forced him in despair to confess falsely." Id.; see also Brief for Relator-Appellant, supra note 20, at 9-11 (summarizing Samuel's testimony of police brutality, which included handcuffing Samuel to a hot radiator, squeezing Samuel's testicles until he was unconscious, threatening to throw Samuel out a window, and threatening to shoot Samuel). Samuel testified that detectives spent a good part of eleven hours beating him with "a blackjack, a rubber hose, and a club." Thomas 1962) . In rebuttal, the prosecutor offered the testimony of detectives and the district attorney, who denied any coercion. Id. The prosecution also offered the testimony of the jail clerk who claimed Samuel only complained of swollen legs caused by rheumatic fever. Id. The jail physician testified that while he did find some injuries, they were inconsequential compared to the torture described by Samuel. Id.
Witness Helps Defense, supra note 35.
The same jury recommended a life sentence. 41 The sentencing judge ordered death by electrocution 42 based on the evidence presented at trial and additional information obtained from probation officers and other sources pursuant to the New York Criminal Code. 43 The sentencing judge found that Samuel committed the uncharged burglaries for which he had originally been arrested, 44 that Samuel "possessed a morbid sexuality," and that Samuel was a "menace to society." 45 [Samuel] perfected what he thought was a foolproof method of earning a living in an easy way. Like others of this kind, however, he finally found himself in a situation, not to his liking, and decided to destroy whatever was in his way to a continued success in the criminal career chosen by him. It is unfortunate that his path was blocked by this young girl who showed such bravery, in the protection of her life.
Brief for Appellant-Defendant, supra note 44, at 9. According to the Court, Samuel did not challenge the accuracy of the report, ask the judge to disregard it, or request an opportunity to refute any portion through cross-examination or any other means. Williams, 337 U.S. at 244. 46. Youth Sentenced to Die in the Chair, supra note 40. The judge during sentencing discussed information from a detective that Samuel was seen taking photographs of young children at public schools. Brief for Appellant-Defendant, supra note 44, at 8. The sentencing judge also relied on the following as evidence of Samuel's morbid sexuality:
We also have the situation involving the Goldiner family who resided in the groundfloor apartment at 145 Legion Street, about two weeks before [Samuel's] arrest at about two a.m. At that time, their seven-year-old daughter was asleep alone in a rear room, the parents being in another room. The child says that she was awakened when she felt someone twisting her feet. She says that the lower part of her pajamas had
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Making the Right Call 799 recommendation of life imprisonment would have been different if these "facts" had been presented to the jury, 47 the judge stated that "it would stultify [his] conscience" to accept the jury's sentence. 48 A unanimous New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and death sentence. 49 Samuel appealed to the United States Supreme Court on the narrow ground that due process was offended by the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine or rebut information considered for the first time at sentencing. 50 The Court held that due process was not "a device for freezing the evidential procedure of sentencing in the mold of trial procedure," reasoning that such a reading would "hinder if not preclude all courts-state and federal-from making progressive efforts to improve the administration of criminal justice." 51 Due process also could not render a sentence void simply because a judge obtained out-of-court information to assist in fixing punishment. 52 The Williams Court held due process did not require confrontation at felony sentencing, and so a broad range of unchallenged evidence could be used to support a higher sentence. 53 The Court been taken off and the defendant placed himself on top of her and placed his penis between her legs. He had one of his hands over her mouth to prevent her from making any outcry. He then arose, and as he was buttoning his pants, she made an outcry [,] which frightened the defendant, who ran out of the apartment. The mother of the child says that she found evidence of discharge on the bed of the child. The child also positively identified the defendant as the one who perpetrated this act. 53. Williams, 337 U.S. at 252. Justice Murphy offered a short and direct dissent, arguing that "[d]ue process of law includes . . . the idea that a person accused of crime shall be accorded a fair hearing through all stages of the proceedings against him." Id. at 253 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (also urging sentencing judges to hesitate when increasing punishment beyond that which the jury recommended). Justice Murphy argued:
The record . . . indicates that the judge exercised his discretion to deprive a man of his life, in reliance on material made available to him in a probation report, consisting reasoned that consideration of uncrossed information for purposes of sentencing was a discretionary power that dated to Pre-Founding times. 54 The Court explained:
[B]oth before and since the American colonies became a nation, courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence used to assist him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed within limits fixed by law. 55 The Court described New York's sentencing statute as one that emphasized the "prevalent modern philosophy of penology that punishment should fit the offender, and not merely the crime." 56 New York declared reformation and rehabilitation more important goals than retribution. 57 The Court was apparently content to let New York (and other states) determine the appropriateness of sentencing procedures "to serve the new goals of indeterminate sentencing. Without a doubt, the Framers would not recognize the modern American criminal justice system. 60 As Justice Kennedy recently acknowledged, plea-bargaining has become so central to the administration of criminal justice that it is no longer simply an adjunct of the system, "it is the . . . system." 61 Perhaps plea-bargaining occurred at the time of the Founding, though the earliest record does not appear until 1809. 62 Before the Founding, a pre-determined sentence resulted 63 if a defendant was found guilty; a common prescription for many felonies was death. 64 This "determinate" system of unitary trials and sentencing left little or no role for the trial judge regarding a defendant's sentence. This was quite different from U.S. practice at the time of Williams, where guilt (or was adopted in 1791, the States uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses." (citing HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 5-6, 15, 27-28 (rev. ed. 1967))). Death was by hanging, embowelment, or burning alive. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *370. Punishment for other felonies included mutilation or dismembering, slitting of the nostrils, branding of the hand, whipping, hard labor, exile, banishment, loss of liberty, and temporary imprisonment. Id. Despite these myriad of options, Blackstone made clear that the quantity or degree of punishment was "ascertained for every offence; and that it [was] not left in the breast of any judge, nor even of a jury, to alter that judgment." Id. at *371. Blackstone warned that "if judgments were to be the private opinions of the judge, men would then be slaves to their magistrates, and would live in society without knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them under." Id.
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 67 Professor Benjamin McMurray argues that the Sixth Amendment's "introductory clause, 'in all criminal prosecutions,' prefaces all of the rights listed in this amendment," 68 which include the rights to counsel, confrontation, jury trial, speedy and public trial, as well as rights relating to notice of conduct and access to witnesses. 69 However, the term "criminal prosecutions" is left undefined, and Founding era documents do not provide guidance on the meaning or scope of the term. 70 Scholars who advocate an "original objective meaning" interpretive approach 71 proposed the document to the states for adoption and ratification. Id. at 461. Original understanding refers to the meaning and understanding of the U.S. Constitution from the perspective of those who participated in the various state ratifying conventions. Id.
72. See Douglass, supra note 60, at 2008 ("If the textual question is simply whether a sentencing is part of a 'criminal prosecution,' the answer would seem self-evident. After all, why bother with the process of criminal prosecution if not for the sentence?"); see also White, supra note 63, at 393 (arguing that the right to confront at a capital sentencing hearing is supported by a simple reading of the relevant constitutional text). At least one jurist agreed with Douglass and White. See United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Surely no one would contend that sentencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a 'criminal prosecution.' "). IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 54 (1951) ; see also White, supra note 63, at 395 ("Sixth Amendment rights do not begin and end with the in-court proceeding commonly known as a trial."); McMurray, supra note 68, at 616 (arguing that "the entire process of securing the criminal judgment [is] the prosecution," and noting that "where a defendant pleads guilty to one count in exchange for the government's promise to dismiss other counts, the government will typically not dismiss the other counts until after the defendant has been sentenced, [which confirms] that until the defendant has been sentenced, the prosecution is not yet over"). 76. The twelve stages of the criminal prosecution described by Blackstone are arrest, commitment and bail, prosecution, process upon indictment, arraignment and its incidents, plea and issue, trial and conviction, benefit of clergy, judgment and its consequences, reversal of judgment, reprieve and pardon, and execution. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *286; see also McMurray, supra note 68, at 617. McMurray noted that the term "prosecution," which is third in this list of stages, refers only to the charging. See id. Post-ratification meaning and common usage of the term criminal prosecution support Blackstone and his followers' understanding that sentencing was considered a part of the criminal prosecution. An early nineteenth century dictionary defined the term "prosecution" as the "institution or commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal, and pursuing them to final judgment." 80 Thus, various sources support Blackstone's description of the sentencing process as one stage of a criminal prosecution. 81 The text of the Sixth Amendment is not only silent on the meaning of the term "criminal prosecution," but on whether a sentencing court has discretionary authority to influence punishment in felony cases. Professors Byrne and F. Andrew Hessick argued that the drafters of the Sixth Amendment had little reason to consider trial authority separate from sentencing authority, primarily because at that time "the process of sentencing was virtually indistinguishable from the process of conviction." 82 Felony crimes in the pre-Founding determinate era were submitted to a jury, and the defendant could predict a sentence with precision from the face of the charging instrument, which flowed from the alignment of punishment with the crime. 83 In this model of unitary prosecution, 84 sentencing evidence in felony cases was by necessity 82. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 59, at 51 (noting that colonial era judges did not conduct a formal sentencing proceeding following conviction; instead, most crimes carried a particular penalty, and the conviction determined the punishment); see also Douglass, supra note 60, at 1972, 2011 (cautioning against the temptation to conclude that "the Sixth Amendment contemplates no sentencing rights" simply "because it contemplates no separate sentencing proceeding"). See generally Bibas, supra note 70, at 46; Herman, supra note 58, at 302-03; White, supra note 63, at 396.
FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY
See
83. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000); see also 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 64, at *369 (after verdict "the court must pronounce that judgment, which the law hath annexed to the crime"); Bibas, supra note 70, at 46, 48 (noting that punishment was immediately imposed); Douglass, supra note 60, at 1977 (describing English and early U.S. criminal law as dominated by mandatory penalties, not sentencing discretion presented-and confronted-during the trial.
85
According to Professor John Douglass, "in both purpose and effect, the trial was the sentencing." 86 Unfortunately, few Sixth Amendment cases of significance were decided during the determinate era, 87 and none concerned whether un-cross-examined evidence could be presented for purposes of fixing felony punishment or establishing the limits of judicial discretion at felony sentencing hearings.
Sentencing courts' discretionary authority in felony cases likely emerged during the era of indeterminate sentencing. By the early twentieth century, determinate sentencing was no longer the dominant sentencing model, and by the mid-twentieth century, felony sentencing reflected indeterminate ideals. 88 Indeterminate sentencing was greatly influenced by the public's growing aversion to the death penalty, 89 the use of prisons as a sentencing alternative, 90 and, as revealed in Williams, an emerging penological focus on individualized punishment. 91 Williams demonstrates how this culminated in a highly discretionary rehabilitative model that tasked courts with that system as their point of reference, they crafted a single set of adversarial rights to govern all of the proceedings . . ."); see also White, supra note 63, at 397.
85. See Douglass, supra note 60, at 2008, 2016. The rules appeared to be different for misdemeanors. Id. at 2016 (noting that in the late eighteenth century, English and colonial American judges "exercised a range of discretion in choosing punishment for misdemeanants"); see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480 n.7 (noting that, upon misdemeanants, judges frequently imposed sentences of fines or whippings).
86. Douglass, supra note 60, at 1972-73 ("Bifurcation-separating the guilt determination from the choice of an appropriate penalty-was a procedure that evolved after the [F]ounding, initially for noncapital sentencing."); see also id. at 2020; Hessick & Hessick, supra note 59, at 51 (describing pre-Founding sentencing as part of the trial); White, supra note 63, at 397 (noting that pre-Founding felony juries decided both the defendant's guilt and punishment).
87. Chhablani, supra note 69, at 492. 88. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-51 (1949) (explaining due process was not a "uniform command that courts throughout the Nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence"). 
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Two other notable changes developed during the post-Founding emergence of indeterminate sentencing: bifurcated trials with guilt and sentencing phases 97 and plea-bargaining. 98 Bifurcation evolved from the "parallel movements" towards judicial discretion and individualized punishment. 99 Unlike determinate sentencing where the punishment for most felonies was death, indeterminate sentencing allowed broader discretion to imprison convicted felons. 100 A sentencing judge's determination of the length of imprisonment required indeterminate sentencing judges to consider the nature of the offense and the unique circumstances of the individual. 101 Accordingly, Douglass posited that indeterminate judges needed more information-which was presented during a separate sentencing process-than their determinate-era counterparts. 102 While the exact causation is unclear, the advent of offender and offense-oriented sentencing factors established sentencing as a distinct procedural phase of the trial. 103 1830s and 1840s) ; see also supra note 62 and accompanying text (noting 1809 as the earliest example of clear plea bargaining in the U.S. colonies). The adoption of adult parole and probation services was also an important development during the post-Founding era. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 89, at 599 (discussing creation of reformatories for young male offenders and arguing that adoption of the indeterminate sentencing model and parole law occurred together). While the sentencing judge decided the punishment, it was the parole board that decided the date of release. Id. at 607. Warner also noted that the first instances of probation occurred in seventeenth century Massachusetts, and that by 1910 twenty states adopted adult probation statutes. See id. at 598-99. Warner indicated that the duty of the probation officer was to furnish the judge with information about a defendant's criminal history. Id. at 607. See generally Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 11 (2010) (discussing early statutory history of probation in federal system).
99. Douglass, supra note 60, at 2018. Douglass suggests that bifurcation was the result of the need to separately consider information at a sentencing hearing that could not be introduced at trial. Id. at 2018-19 (arguing that the rules of evidence conflicted with the emerging preference for making punishment fit not only the crime, but also the individual criminal because evidence relating to bad character was considered unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible at trial). 100. Id. at 2016-17; see also White, supra note 63, at 397-98 (noting that the nineteenth century saw both the creation of felony sentencing discretion and the division of felony trials into separate guilt and sentencing phases).
101. McMurray, supra note 68, at 592. 102. Douglass, supra note 60, at 2018 (noting indeterminate era judges' newfound ability to exercise discretion and individualize sentences and arguing that "[i]f judges were to tailor their sentences to fit individual offenders, they needed to know more about that individual than a trial-or guilty plea-was likely to tell them").
103. See Herman, supra note 58, at 302.
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[VOL. 47:3 few controls to limit the sentencing judge's discretion to decide a defendant's punishment. 104 Like bifurcation, guilty pleas also flourished during the indeterminate sentencing era. While there is some evidence of guilty pleas prior to the Founding, such instances were rare in English common law cases and were infrequent in the U.S. colonies. 105 By the late 1830s in Boston, guilty pleas began to appear in significant numbers in common-law-based cases; ten years later, they were accepted for virtually every sort of offense. 106 By 1860, guilty pleas were solidly institutionalized, 107 and by the late nineteenth century, judges across the nation had become willing partners in the plea bargaining process. 108 Pinpointing when guilty pleas became common is difficult, 109 although by the 1920s the practice was well established. 110 It may be tempting to assume that early plea-bargaining developed at the initiation of the prosecution, the defense, or both. However, Justin Miller, an early twentieth century legal commentator, suggested that prosecutors may not have initiated plea offers and, in some cases, may not have participated in plea negotiations at all. 111 Instead, Miller opined that trial judges initiated early pleabargaining, which could have involved a dismissal, a plea of guilty to a lesser offense, or a plea of guilty to the charged offense. Miller argued that the concept of forgiveness by an aggrieved person, which he described as "condonation," was long recognized by 1927 but was "supposed to have no effect in preventing prosecution. . . . In practice, however, the condonation and compromise of criminal cases [was] frequent and the methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law [were] varied." Id.; see also Moley, supra note 109, at 97, 118 (noting that by 1926 in Cook County, Illinois, 13,117 felony prosecutions entered preliminary hearing and 492 resulted in a complete jury trial; during the same year in Chicago, slightly more than one percent of cases initiated as felonies resulted in a jury verdict of guilty on the felony charge; these sources do not specify whether the remaining cases were resolved by dismissals, guilty pleas, or bench trials). There also appeared to be an increase in jury trial waivers, presumably in favor of bench trials. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 89, at 592 (noting that in the late nineteenth century waiver of jury trial in criminal cases was common in few states but that by 1937 it was permitted in the federal courts and over half of the states).
111. Miller, supra note 110, at 8, 10. 112. Id. at 10.
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Miller also presented evidence that trial judges refused to have any part in compromises. Other trial judges privately expressed to the parties the propriety of a settlement. Still other trial judges openly bargained in court with the accused.
113
Cases in which pleas were commonly used included desertion or failure to provide for wife or children; 
Professors Sam
Warner and Henry Cabot noted large increases in the number of petty offenses and the "recent revival . . . of outlawry," which was attributed to the inability of the courts and authorities to handle modern crime. 120. See id. at 20 (noting the inadequacy of courts to accommodate increased case loads and the irksome burden of jury duty on the public); see also Mnookin, supra note 9, at 1728 (arguing that increased caseloads significantly contributed to the judiciary's changing attitude about the merits of negotiated pleas); Warner & Cabot, supra note 89, at 590 (discussing the striking growth in the number of cases per judge and noting that the number of judges did not keep pace with the rapid population growth). 
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[VOL. 47:3 communication brought people closer together, multiplied frictions, and increased governmental supervision. 125 The increase in the number of criminal acts allowed for an expanded role for counsel. 126 The U.S. Constitution reflected an early acceptance of the adversarial system and a rejection of the English common law prohibition on defense counsel. 127 Experienced defense bars emerged in most U.S. colonies, 128 and these lawyers were knowledgeable about the constitutional rules governing substantive and procedural criminal rights. 129 Originally, this system worked to the defendant's advantage. By the mid-eighteenth century, the acquittal rate for represented defendants in New Jersey was seventyseven percent, while the acquittal rate for unrepresented defendants was merely eighteen percent. 130 From at least 1810 on, almost every defendant in New York exercised the right to representation by counsel. 131 The mere presence of counsel did not mean that the adversarial system as we know it today operated during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 132 Still, by the height of the indeterminate sentencing era the United States had developed a distinct adversarial system. Nevertheless, few constitutionally prescribed controls limited the sentencing judge's discretion to decide a defendant's punishment. In the next Part, this Article questions whether recent developments in confrontation jurisprudence require reconsideration of confrontation rights at felony sentencing.
125. Miller, supra note 110, at 18; see also McWhorter, supra note 124, at 98 (opining that automobiles afforded criminals the ability to "play hide and seek" with law enforcement).
126. Miller, supra note 110, at 16-18 (noting the creation of new laws prohibiting the manufacture and sale of liquor, regulating securities, and governing the issuances of checks and other evidences of value, as well as new laws regulating automobiles); see also Warner & Cabot, supra note 89, at 585 (noting the increase in crimes committed and prosecuted).
127. Randolph N. 
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III. A RENEWED COMMITMENT TO CROSS-EXAMINATION
[C]ross-examination is the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth. 133 In the decades after Williams, due process became the vehicle through which the Sixth Amendment and virtually all Bill of Rights protections were interpreted to apply to criminal defendants in state courts. 134 But the Sixth Amendment was not incorporated in whole during the six years in which the Court considered whether the Counsel, Confrontation, and Jury Trial Clauses applied against the states. 135 Interpretations of what due process required varied between the Amendment's clauses, 136 each of which had to be separately deemed fundamental or essential to a fair trial. 137 Additionally, some clauses were deemed to only apply at the trial stage of the criminal prosecution, while others applied beyond the trial. With regard to sentencing rights, the Confrontation Clause provided the least protection (actually none). 138 The Counsel Clause provided the broadest protection 139 and had already been interpreted to apply at all critical stages of federal criminal prosecutions. 140 In fact, for years before Williams, the Court had determined on a case-by-case basis whether the lack of counsel at state 136. Chhablani, supra note 69, at 520-21 (discussing the Court's interpretation of "criminal prosecution," the meaning of which depends on the procedural right at issue, and advocating for a broad definition based on the term "criminal offense").
137. See, e.g., Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404 (holding that the appearance of confrontation rights in the Sixth Amendment's text reflects the Framers' belief that "confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution"); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149 ("[W]e believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice . . . "). 
812
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141
By the late 1960s, counsel was required for an array of post-verdict proceedings, including sentencing, appeals, and probation hearings. 142 In the years following the expansion of the Sixth Amendment, lower federal courts remained disinclined to reexamine whether and to what extent sentencing discretion was limited by application of the Confrontation Clause. 143 Relying on the close link with hearsay rules, many lower federal courts held that confrontation did not apply post-trial. 144 Actual cross-examination was unnecessary to determine reliability, which was all that due process required. 145 . Not all circuits initially adopted this majority view. See United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 103-04 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that while there is a right to cross examine witnesses at criminal sentencing, the hearsay standard of reliability governs confrontation challenges), overruled by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 400 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) ("[P]rotections of the right of confrontation apply at the guilt phase, but it does not follow that the same protections apply at sentencing simply because facts proved at sentencing may increase a defendant's sentence.").
145. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1102-03 (3d Cir. 1990) (arguing that confrontation violations occur only when a court relies on misinformation of a constitutional magnitude because hearsay is normally considered at sentencing as long as the due process standard is met); see also Chhablani, supra note 69, at 498-99 (discussing the Burger Court and its reading of confrontation rights to require a showing of unreliability as a definitional element).
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151
Until recently, the Confrontation Clause did not require actual cross-examination at trial. In fact, it was generally accepted that the Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules were of the same origindue process-and designed to protect similar values-trustworthiness and reliability. 152 Ohio v. Roberts best articulated the shared standard:
[W]hen a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In The Roberts Court affirmed the rule that where a witness was unavailable, the Constitution was satisfied by hearsay that was reliable and trustworthy. 154 In Roberts, the defendant was arrested and charged with forging a check and possessing stolen credit cards. 155 Anita Isaacs, the daughter of the victims, 156 testified at the preliminary hearing and admitted that she knew the defendant and that she permitted the defendant to stay at her apartment for several days while she was away; she also testified that she neither gave the defendant her parents' checks and credit cards nor granted the defendant permission to use them. 157 At trial, the defendant testified that Anita provided the checkbook and credit cards with the understanding that he was allowed to use them. 158 Anita did not appear at trial and, after the judge found that she was unavailable, the prosecution was allowed to admit her preliminary hearing transcript to rebut the defendant's testimony. 159 The intermediate courts in Ohio reversed, finding no good faith showing of unavailability because the prosecution failed to seek Anita's whereabouts for purposes of trial or otherwise determine whether she could be found. 160 Ohio's highest court reinstated the finding that Anita was unavailable, reasoning that increased due diligence would not have procured Anita's attendance at trial because her whereabouts were entirely unknown. 161 Still, defense counsel's questioning at the preliminary hearing did not amount to a cross-examination, nor was the defendant afforded constitutionally sufficient confrontation for purposes of trial. 162 
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Making the Right Call 815 defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Anita at the preliminary hearing. 163 Roberts acknowledged that while the Confrontation Clause was intended to limit some hearsay, literal application of the Clause had been rejected for fear that virtually every hearsay exception would be abrogated. 164 When weighed against competing interests furthered by hearsay rules, Roberts made clear that the Confrontation Clause only "reflect[ed] a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial." 165 Additionally, the Court opined that some hearsay rules stemmed from the same historical origins as the Confrontation Clause. 166 In such cases, reliability was a sufficient surrogate, 167 as due process only required cross-examination when an actual hearsay violation occurred. 168 Perhaps persuaded that hearsay rules strayed too far from confrontation's "original meaning," 169 the Court reexamined the historical origins and text of the Confrontation Clause twenty-five years after Roberts in Crawford v. Washington. 170 The Crawford Court ruled that confrontation principles prohibited admission of testimonial statements by a wife against her husband, the defendant, and against whom she could not testify based on spousal privilege. 171 The Crawford Court reasoned that history supported two inferences about the Founder's understanding of confrontation rights. First, the Confrontation Clause was intended to prohibit ex-parte examinations as evidence against an accused. 173 Second, testimonial statements of absent witnesses were not allowed without a showing of unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 174 The Court examined application of hearsay rules in other confrontation cases, including Roberts, and held that the due process standard was (perhaps inherently) unpredictable and unreliable. 175 Confrontation standards were higher than due process requirements: "Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." 176 Mrs. Crawford's statements closely paralleled those that the Framers intended to regulate, 177 and the Court found that admission of her statements violated confrontation principles. 178 Noting that "testimonial statements" can be used for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted, 179 the Court explicitly limited the scope of the Confrontation Clause to "witnesses against the accused" who "bear testimony." 180 After Crawford, use of testimonial statements required more than the due process standard of "minimum indicium of reliability." 181 The Court left for another day how to distinguish between statements that were testimonial and those that were not. 182 
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operator who answered a victim's call about a domestic dispute were nontestimonial and admissible. 184 The Indiana courts disagreed about whether to admit a victim's affidavit that was executed and given to law enforcement officers who responded to a domestic disturbance complaint at the victim's home. 185 According to the Davis Court, statements were testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicated that no ongoing emergency existed and the primary purpose of the interrogation (or questioning) was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution. 186 Statements were nontestimonial when given in the course of an interrogation (or questioning) and where circumstances objectively indicated that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to assist police during an ongoing emergency. 187 Recognizing that Crawford did not require cross-examination of every statement, Davis demonstrates the fluidity of the testimonial/ nontestimonial distinction. 188 The Court instructed that for confrontation purposes, statements might begin as nontestimoniali.e., responsive to an interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance-but later evolve into testimonial statements once that purpose has been achieved. 189 Relying on this reasoning, the Court ruled that the recorded 911 statements in Washington state were nontestimonial, and properly admitted, because (1) the victim spoke about events not in the past, but as they actually happened, (2) the victim's call for help was against a bona fide physical threat, and (3) elicitation of the victim's statements was necessary to the 184. Id. at 818-19. In the call, the Indiana defendant's ex-girlfriend provided defendant's name and accused him of assault. Id. at 817-18. The defendant was present during this portion of the call. Id. After informing the operator that the defendant had left the scene, the victim described the context of the assault and provided other identifying information about the defendant. Id. at 818.
185.
Id. at 819-21. In Washington, officers found the victim alone on her front porch; she later gave permission for officers to enter the home where the defendant, her husband, was waiting in the kitchen. Id. at 819. After questioning the victim in her living room, officers provided an affidavit, which she filled out and signed. Id. at 819-20. One officer remained in the kitchen with the defendant, who attempted to participate in the conversation. The testimonial character of the statement separated it from hearsay that was subject to traditional limitations barring admission under due process, but not confrontation, principles. Id. at 821. Statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations were considered to be in a core class of testimonial statements. Id. at 822.
189. Id. at 828. The Court expressed confidence in the trial courts' ability to recognize the point at which statements became testimonial for confrontation purposes. Id. at 829.
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sliding scale whereby the greater the statement's quantitative value the more likely cross-examination assists in truth-finding. Both, however, are important to a determination of whether cross-examination should be necessary for three general categories of statements that are regularly considered by sentencing courts. Each is discussed in turn.
A. Category One: Testimonial Statements to Prove the Existence of a Prior Conviction
Undoubtedly, prior convictions are material to punishment. Nonetheless, in most cases cross-examination of this category of testimonial statements is unnecessary. Prior convictions are commonly proved by certified court records, which are non-testimonial and widely available electronically. Only in rare cases will testimonial statements assist in an assessment of the truth of a prior conviction.
B. Category Two: Testimonial Statements to Prove Facts Related to the Sentencing Offense
Testimonial statements to prove facts related to the sentencing offense or offenses are material to punishment, especially in our plea-bargaining system. Defendants who bargain for a plea serve lower sentences 198 because prosecutors do not pursue the most serious charges or the most severe punishment. 199 Determining whether this category of testimonial statements would assist in an assessment of truth and veracity is unnecessary where material facts about the sentencing offense are admitted by the defendant and entered into the record (or included in the plea agreement) at the time the plea is accepted. Most police reports, victim and witness statements, and other documents containing material facts should have been gathered during the investigatory stage and, upon the request of defense counsel, disclosed before the plea. 200 The trial 198. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 61, at 1909. "Before contracting, the defendant bears the risk of conviction with the maximum sentence while the prosecutor bears the reciprocal risk of a costly trial followed by acquittal." Id. at 1914. Scott and Stuntz argue that "[c]riminal defendants, as a group, are able to reduce the risk of the imposition of maximum sanctions" but that prosecutors more than criminal defendants "obtain a larger net return from criminal convictions" through plea bargaining. Id. at 1915 . 199. Id. at 1909 . See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i) (in federal cases, a document or object is discoverable if "the item is material to preparing the defense"). This includes documents or objects judge can ascertain the defendant's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary acceptance of the statements' veracity in the same manner as the court establishes the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of other constitutional rights.
Unfortunately, many state courts establish the facts material to the sentencing offense after accepting the plea. 201 At first glance, this appears part of the promissory exchange-the defendant has waived his right to trial in exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation of a specific sentence. 202 Still, plea bargains are not enforced according to "garden-variety" contract principles of offer and acceptance. Defendants negotiate with the prosecutor but contract with the judge. 203 The defendant who agrees to a plea has a lower reliance on a prosecutor's promises, 204 which rarely include those related to veracity of testimonial statements regarding the sentencing offense. Moreover, a prosecutor can only recommend a sentence to the judge, who alone determines punishment. 205 Unlike a prosecutor's promises, a defendant's are rarely revocable after the plea has been entered. Thus, a defendant's promise to enter a plea is a somewhat one-sided agreement. 206 Allowing limited cross-examination of testimonial statements to prove the facts material to the sentencing offense increases the odds that a defendant will get the agreement for which the parties have bargained. In the plea bargaining context, the difference between a good and bad deal depends on defense counsel's knowledge of likely trial outcomes, including the behavior of judges
